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RESPONSE TO CONDITIONAL CROSS APPEAL 
Appellee states that she is conditionally cross appealing in this case, with the 
request that if this Court grants Keith's appeal and awards Keith half of the contested 
accounts, that the trial court should revisit its alimony award to take into account any 
change in the parties' need and ability to pay that may result from that change in the 
award of the funds at issue here. Keith does not disagree that, should he prevail on his 
appeal, the case should be remanded to the trial court with directions to revisit the 
equitable division of the marital estate and his award of alimony. 
However, Sharon's claim on appeal that she might be entitled to alimony is 
unfounded insofar as she pied in her Petition that no alimony should be awarded to either 
party [R.2], and she did not otherwise preserve that issue with the trial court. See Bell v. 
Bell, 2013 UT App 248,128,312 P.3d 951, 957. 
ARGUMENT 
Sharon raises a number of abstract and convoluted arguments in her Appellee 
Brief, most of which were not raised or factually supported at the trial. But this appeal is 
not complicated. In its oral ruling and the written order, the trial court explicitly 
acknowledged that Schedule A to the Smith Family Trust governed the disposition of the 
two financial accounts at issue ( a Zions Bank money market account and an LPL 
brokerage account, both held in Petitioner's name, the "Brokerage Accounts"). The trial 
4 
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court interpreted the Financial Accounts Provision of Schedule A-which split all 
vj financial accounts equally-to not apply to the Brokerage Accounts. It erred. This 
appeal begins and ends with that analysis. Sharon's other arguments are misdirected, and 
do not address the actual issue on this appeal. Nevertheless, Keith will briefly address 
them in order. 
I. The Only Relevant Inquiry is the Trial Court's Erroneous Interpretation of 
Schedule A. 
Sharon makes only one argument that was actually addressed at trial-that the 
check Sharon received should be considered her "interest" in her family limited 
I..:;) partnership, and therefore excluded from the operation of the Financial Accounts 
Provision of Schedule A. This was the argument of Plaintiffs counsel, [R.181: 119], and 
the subject of Plaintiffs testimony, [R.181 :25-29]. It is also the argument adopted by the 
trial court, but it is incorrect, as Keith has already explained in his Opening Brief. 
Contrary to Sharon's argument (and her mischaracterization of Keith's arguments 
on this appeal), an interest in a limited partnership includes a right to receive 
distributions, but the actual funds once distributed are not the "interest" in the 
Vii partnership. Once distributed, those funds are simply funds owned by the recipient, and 
are fungible with all other funds owned by that person. To state that those funds continue 
to be part of the partnership is incorrect and would lead to all kinds of legal mischief, and 
no law exists to create such a result. 
5 
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Those funds certainly could be traced to the partnership, and Keith agrees that 
those funds would generally be considered Sharon's separate property in the absence of 
the Smith Family Trust (and particularly Schedule A) or other commingling, but it was 
legal error for the Court to interpret those funds are being "Sharon's interest" in the 
partnership, and therefore disregard the plain language of Schedule A of the Smith 
Family Trust. The impact of Schedule A is that half of all financial accounts, including 
the Brokerage Accounts, were Keith's separate property. The provision at issue, the 
Financial Accounts Provision, reads as follows: 
The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all 
future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all 
new accounts and the accumulations and the future additions, interest or 
accumu1ation in any and all other financial institutions in which new 
accounts are opened in the future ... " 
Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29 (emphasis added). 
There are no missing tenns, uncertain terms, or other facial deficiencies in the 
language, and Sharon has never argued that there are. As a result, the trial court should 
have looked solely to the "plain meaning" of that language inside the four comers of 
Schedule A. Hull v. Wilcock, 2012 UT App 223, 1127-28, 285 P.3d 815, 823; Makoff v. 
Makojf, 528 P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974). The Financial Accounts Provision states that it 
covers "all new accounts .. .in any and all other financial institutions in which new 
accounts are opened in the future ... " This language is comprehensive and all-
encompassing, and leaves no room for any financial accounts to be excluded for any 
6 
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reason. The trial court erred in its determination that the Brokerage Accounts were 
~ Sharon's separate property, and therefore erred in its distribution of those funds. 
II. The Court Did not Make Any Equitable Distribution of the Brokerage Accounts. 
Sharon argues that the trial court's ruling can be considered an "equitable 
distribution" of the Brokerage Accounts to Sharon, and affinned on this basis. This 
argument lacks any evidentiary support and cannot be the basis for affinning the trial 
court's ruling. The trial court did not make any equitable distribution or any findings that 
would support or lead to such a distribution. Indeed, the lack of findings sufficient to 
support Sharon's argument would make such an undisclosed "equitable distribution" 
reversible error as a matter oflaw. See Bell v. Bell, 2013 UT App 248, ,r 21, 312 P.3d 
951, 956 (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988)). The trial court's 
ruling is clear that the award of the Brokerage Accounts to Sharon was governed by 
Exhibit A to the Smith Family Trust, and that the trial court interpreted that provision to 
not apply to the Brokerage Accounts. [R.181: 146 (Trial Tr.); R.165-66.] In the face of a 
clear expression of the trial court's logic, this Court should not pretend that the trial court 
engaged in a different wholly different analysis. The trial court's determination that the 
Brokerage Accounts were Sharon's separate property was based on its erroneous 
interpretation of the Smith Family Trust and, therefore, is error. 
7 
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III. Sharon's Alternative Interpretations of the Smith Family Trust Are Incorrect 
and Were Not Supported at Trial. 
Sharon proposes a unique interpretation of the Smith Family Trust and Schedule 
A. These interpretations were not raised at trial, nor does Sharon cite to any record 
evidence ( other than the Trust itself) to support her arguments. Moreover, her arguments 
should be rejected because they are not supported by the actual language of the Smith 
Family Trust and Schedule A. 
Most of Sharon's arguments ask the Court to disregard Schedule A as a separate, 
self-contained document that merely lists assets governed by the language in the Smith 
Family Trust. Ignoring Schedule A, however, is not tenable. Schedule A, though 
denominated as a "schedule," is a stand-alone deed, signed separately and apart from the 
Smith Family Trust. There is no basis to look beyond the }?_t;.ovisions of that deed to 
interpret its meaning. That deed provided that they would equally split 
The following accounts in the following institutions, together with all 
future additions, interest or accumulations therein and also including all 
new accounts and the accumulations and the future additions, interest or 
accumulation in any and all other financial institutions in which new 
accounts are opened in the future ... " 
Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29 (the "Financial Accounts Provision"). That deed also mentions the 
Limited Partnership, and states that Sharon alone is entitled to 
All interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda Fincher Family Limited 
Pa11nership, an Arizona Limited Partnership. 
8 
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Trial Ex. 2, pg. 29. Contrary to Sharon's arguments, neither of these provisions is more 
vtl) "specific" than the other, and they both are entitled to equal effect. Nor do they overlap. 
Again, contrary to Sharon's arguments, her "interest" in the limited partnership 
includes a right to receive distributions, but the distributed funds are not themselves the 
partnership interest. Once distributed, those funds are simply fungible money owned by 
the recipient, separate and apart from the continuing partnership interest itself. Sharon 
deeded half of all her then existing and future financial accounts to Keith, and when she 
deposited that money in the Brokerage Accounts, half became Keith's separate property 
under the plain language of Schedule A. 
Sharon also argues that Schedule A does not have a separate line item for "future 
accounts" and, as a result, it does not allocate future accounts at all. This argument 
ignores the language of the deed, which identifies the existing accounts "together with" 
all future accounts, and divides them equally between Keith and Sharon. There can be no 
real dispute that the future accounts were to be treated identically with those specifically 
identified. Sharon's argument merely attempts to "create ambiguity" where none exists. 
Mind & Motion Utah Investments, LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6, ,I 42, ---P.3d---. 
This is unavailing. 
Leaving the language of Schedule A altogether, Sharon then argues that the 
lul "Additions to the Trust" provision should be interpreted to reach a result contrary to the 
language of Schedule A. She misreads the language of the Smith Family Trust, 
9 
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attempting to reach the conclusion that any property Sharon chose to take possession of 
automatically became Sharon's separate property in her "sub-trust", bypassing Schedule 
A and the Smith Family Trust altogether. This is not how the Smith Family Trust works, 
and certainly does not harmonize the Smith Family Trust provisions and Schedule A. 
Instead, Schedule A deeded half of the Brokerage Accounts to Keith's portion of 
the Smith Family Trust and half to Sharon's portion. The "Additions to the Trust" 
language Sharon cites and emphasizes actually supports and gives effect to this 
allocation: 
Any additional prope11y received by the Trustee shall become a part of 
the Trust into which it is transferred and shall become subject to the 
terms of this Agreement. 
Appellee Brief, pg. 15, citing R.78-79. The Brokerage Accounts were "transferred" in 
. .r 
equal halves to each of Keith and Sharon' "sub-trusts" pursuant to the quit-claim in 
Schedule A. Even if this Court were inclined to ignore Schedule A, the next sentence of 
that same provision mandates the exact same equal division: 
If such property is not specifically appointed to any particular Tmst, it 
shall be allocated equally between the Keith L. Smith Trust and the 
Sharon L. Smith Trust, if both of the Trustors are living, and otherwise 
to the Shelter Trust set f011h therein. 
Appellee Brief at p. 15, citing R.78-79. Accordingly, regardless of the method, the 
outcome of the Smith Family Trust and Schedule A is an equal division of the Brokerage 
Accounts, and the trial court's contrary distribution is error. 
10 
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IV. Sharon Did Not and Cannot Now Revoke Keith's Rights. 
Sharon also argues that she was entitled, and remains entitled, to revoke the Smith 
Family Trust and pull assets back out of Keith's separate portion of the Smith Family 
Trust. Again, no evidence is cited that any "revocation" occurred, and certainly not one 
that actually complied with the operative language of the Smith Family Trust. The 
revocation language of the Smith Family Trust requires a written revocation ( of which 
~ there is no evidence) and only allows Sharon to revoke her portion of the Smith Family 
Trust-not Keith's. The language Sharon cites states in full that 
As long as both of the Trustors are alive, each of them reserves the right, 
without the consent or approval of the other, to amend, modify or revoke 
their separate Trusts under this Agreement, in whole or in part, including 
this Trust, concerning the prope11y that each has contributed to the Trust, 
in whole or in part, also including the principal and the present or past 
undisbursed income from such principal. Such revocation shall be by an 
instmment in writing signed by the Tmstors and shall be effective upon 
signing without notice to any successor Trustee. 
Appellee Brief, pg. 28, citing R.80. The Smith Family Trusts only allows Sharon to 
revoke her separate portion of the Smith Family Trust. It does not pennit her to reach 
into Keith's portion to revoke it as well and help herself to his separate assets. Sharon 
did not revoke the Smith Family Trust prior to funding the Brokerage Accounts, and 
cannot do so retroactively. Notably, in another argument Sharon complains that Keith's 
reading of Schedule A would render her unable to do anything with the distributions she 
received from the limited partnership. This is untrue. Sharon could have properly 
revoked her portion of the Smith Family Trust prior to creating those Brokerage 
11 
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··" 
Accounts, and possibly undone Schedule A. 1 However, she would also have to give up 
any of the benefits of the Smith Family Trust. She chose not to do so, and cannot have it 
both ways. 
Conclusion 
Because the Trial Court's Decree distributing the Brokerage Accounts was based 
solely on its erroneous interpretation of the Smith Family Trust and Schedule A, the Trial 
Court's ruling should be reversed and remanded to divide the Brokerage Accounts equally ~ 
between the parties. 
DATED this 4th day of April, 2016. 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
By:--L-~------------
. Michael D. Black 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1 Keith expresses no opinion on whether or how Schedule A, a deed, could be undone, as 
that was never raised at trial and is not a proper issue here. 
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